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Asean leaders pose for a group photo during the opening ceremony of the Asean Summit. Photo: Xinhua
Opinion
Tang Siew Mun
Tang Siew Mun

Asean found its voice with the Indo-Pacific concept. Now it has to use it or risk losing out

  • Leaders of the 10-member bloc issued a joint Indo-Pacific vision at the Asean Summit, ensuring it has its own framework independent of major powers
  • But to navigate the changing regional order, Asean must be proactive about solidifying its centrality, rather than fixating on its traditional preoccupation of ‘regional cooperation’
Asean has finally found its voice after many years of silence, issuing its own vision for the Indo-Pacific region. On Sunday, at the close of the 34th Asean Summit in Bangkok, leaders from the bloc’s member countries issued the “Asean Outlook for the Indo-Pacific” document. But neither supporters nor detractors of Asean were particularly pleased with the concept.

Australia, India, Japan and the United States have in recent years issued their own proposals for the Indo-Pacific, and Asean was caught on the back foot.

The US, in its ongoing competition with China to maintain its influence in the Asia-Pacific, changed the name of its largest unified military command from the “Pacific Command” to the “Indo-Pacific Command”. It underlined Washington’s commitment to a new strategic vision which identifies a seamless geopolitical space stretching from the Indian to the Pacific oceans.

Why is the US calling Asia-Pacific the Indo-Pacific?

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) the centrepiece of Japan’s Asia policy, focusing on promoting and establishing the rule of law, freedom of navigation and market economy, pursuing economic prosperity and securing peace and stability.

At last year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid out six core principles for the Indo-Pacific, while Australia, in a foreign policy white paper the year before, made 74 references to the Indo-Pacific.

However, the four countries’ enthusiasm for a new Indo-Pacific concept has not yet been matched by commitment of resources for implementation.

Asean’s delay in issuing its vision was understandable. None of the concepts outlined by Australia, India, Japan and the US fully addressed the “China factor” – the relationship that each Asean member and the bloc as a whole share with China. Embracing any of the four concepts meant Asean risked being cast as “choosing sides”.

This is because the four Indo-Pacific concepts portrayed an alternative vision of an emerging regional order that would not revolve around China, thus preventing the emergence of Chinese hegemony. Its supporters were quick to affirm that they were not trying to check China’s diplomatic, economic and strategic advances in the region. But positioning their concepts as an inclusive and “China friendly” initiative was incongruent with their strategic imperatives of checking China’s rising influence.

Asean found a way out of this quandary by introducing its own Indo-Pacific outlook, an effort led by Indonesia. This outlook is a diplomatic solution that neither supports nor rejects existing concepts by the other countries.

But getting Asean members to agree to a shared outlook was not easy. Media reports identified Singapore as the potential “spoiler” seeking to unravel the agreement on the draft Asean document. In reality, Singapore sought to reword some of the draft text and introduce core Asean principles such as the freedom of navigation and overflight.

The ‘Indo-Pacific’ has always been about containing the rise of China

It should also be pointed out that three other Asean member states – Cambodia, Malaysia and the Philippines – exercised the same rights as Singapore in proposing changes to the draft textahead of the Asean Summit.

Singapore’s suggestion to convene the senior officials’ drafting meeting before the summit was a rational move in light of the proposed changes by the four Asean member states. Singapore should therefore not be cast as unsupportive or unconstructive, let alone as a “spoiler”.

Reports of the alleged fraying in consensus around the Asean draft could be interpreted as Asean hanging its dirty laundry out in public, but the episode has in fact strengthened Asean by bringing greater transparency to proceedings and demystifying the highest levels of Asean diplomacy.

Furthermore, the real story is not the tug of war over diplomatic language or the pitched battles over national positions but the 10 Asean member states coming together in the end.

More importantly, the document establishes an Asean position on the Indo-Pacific. It is a “defensive” document, ensuring Asean has its own framework independent of major powers and showing that the bloc will continue to play a central role in navigating the changing regional order.

The document makes clear Asean’s vision of Indo-Pacific “is not aimed at creating new mechanisms or replacing new ones, rather it is an outlook intended to enhance Asean’s community building process” and advocates strengthening Asean centrality.

But the onus is on the bloc to show how this principle of playing a key role in the regional security architecture and power dynamics of bigger countries will translate into practical and actionable initiatives.

Goodbye Asia-Pacific. But why the sudden buzz over Indo-Pacific?

The Indo-Pacific Outlook is in a way a critique of existing mechanisms that claim to showcase Asean centrality – such as the East Asia Summit – given the region’s growing insecurities and new challenges. A “more of the same” approach will no longer suffice.

Asean has to rethink its game plan to maintain and solidify its centrality. It will require members to be proactive about creating and managing a new order, rather than fixate on their sole preoccupation of “regional cooperation”. Still, it is doubtful if members have the political will and drive to move away from the safe familiarity of Asean-led processes that centre almost exclusively on functional cooperation.

The common Asean vision for the Indo-Pacific also skirts around the definition of the Indo-Pacific’s geographical parameters. This could prove problematic as it becomes challenging to cooperate with potential partners without knowing who they are.

In South China Sea, Asean has a choice: ‘Asian values’ or rule of law?

Even if Asean’s geographical scope for the Indo-Pacific does not extend as far as the boundaries articulated in Japan’s vision – which encompasses Kenya and Tanzania – the bloc will need to recalibrate its strategic lens and include countries in the South Asian subcontinent. It is highly doubtful member states are prepared for this new and potentially complicated phase though.

In short, the value of Asean’s Indo-Pacific Outlook is in reminding all parties that it will remain an indispensable player in the region’s geostrategic and geoeconomic landscape.

Given that convergence among major powers is unlikely, Asean will face long odds in its wish to serve as the platform for an expanded regional order. But the odds of a new regional architecture promoting peace and prosperity for countries in the Indo-Pacific would be longer still without Asean’s support and participation.

Dr Tang Siew Mun is Head of Asean Studies at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

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