Daschle and Klain: We're not ready for next Zika virus
We shouldn't be scrambling every time we face a biological threat like anthrax, Ebola or Zika.
In the aftermath of the anthrax attacks of 2001, the Ebola outbreak of 2014 and now Zika, it is no longer a question of if but when the next biosecurity threat will occur. In fact, experts believe a pandemic, not nuclear terrorism or climate change, is most likely to cause 10 million or more deaths in a single event.
Neither one of us set out to become biothreat experts. However, with the anthrax attacks on Tom’s Senate office in 2001, and Ron’s opportunity to serve as the first White House Ebola Response Coordinator a decade later, we learned firsthand how our government responds to such dangers. And we are astonished that some of the same problems and challenges to address biothreats still remain.
While President Obama and Congress have taken many steps to combat this danger, significant gaps in our preparedness remain, particularly in the areas of leadership and resources. The next president, regardless of party, must urgently address these vulnerabilities rather than continuing to pursue an ad hoc approach to dealing with our biosecurity challenges.
Recent events demonstrate how quickly the landscape can change. Four months ago, the World Health Organization issued a list of the top emerging diseases that could cause major epidemics, including Ebola, SARS, and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever. Notably, Zika did not make the list. And even today, work on developing vaccines and preparing U.S. health care facilities for future Ebola-type outbreaks remains unfinished.
Combating biological threats — either naturally occurring like Ebola or Zika, or deliberate, like anthrax or smallpox — requires a coordinated response. We urge the next administration to start planning for biosecurity risks from day one, and to replace the current “governing by crisis” response cycle with a more permanent and resilient approach. We need to build on previous investments in the area, not reinvent the wheel each time a crisis demands a response.
Numerous commissions and panels have concluded that biological threats have the potential for catastrophic consequences within the United States, and have provided recommendations for a path forward. But will policymakers finally act?
For example, a recent Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, chaired by former Governor Tom Ridge and former Senator Joe Lieberman, made a number of short-term and long-term recommendations. Chief among them was the need for a permanent White House leadership structure.
As the nation saw during the Ebola epidemic, given the number of agencies involved in bio-security readiness and response, a coordinated and unified response is needed. Tom has backed the Blue Ribbon Study Panel’s recommendation that responsibility for bio-defense be given to the Vice President of the United States, as the leader of a new cross-cutting Bio-defense Coordination Council at the White House. Ron has written that these activities should be led by a new Deputy Assistant to the President for Pandemic Prevention and Response as part of the National Security Council.
There is precedent for the creation of such a structure. In past administrations, a senior White House point person – Special Assistant to the President for Bio-defense – was fully integrated into the National Security team. However, that position no longer exists. In the Ebola epidemic, a number of dedicated and talented national security and homeland security staffers “owned” pieces of the response, but until President Obama appointed a coordinator, these officials lacked a single leader. The next administration must ensure strong, unified White House leadership.
Zika do's and don'ts: Our view
The Blue Ribbon Study Panel observed that there is a lack of appreciation – both inside and outside the government – for the extent, severity, and reality of biological threats. But, as President Obama’s National Security Council noted in 2009, “The effective dissemination of a lethal biological agent within an unprotected population could place at risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. The unmitigated consequences of such an event could overwhelm our public health capabilities, potentially causing an untold number of deaths. The economic cost could exceed one trillion dollars for each such incident.”
One trillion dollars and countless lives. Why should we wait to address these horrors after-the-fact when we can prepare today? Why should a president have to go hat-in-hand to Congress to request emergency funding each time an event occurs, rather than having available the resources needed to be prepared in advance of the next incident?
We know we cannot prevent every outbreak or attack. However, we can plan. We can prepare. The next administration must organize and prioritize bio-defense and preparedness. This will require strong leadership and a sense of urgency, as well as the recognition that dedicating modest resources today will help avoid costly emergency spending tomorrow. Given what we know now, there is no excuse for not being ready when — not if — the next biological threat occurs.
Tom Daschle, a former U.S. Senate Majority Leader, was a member of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense. Ron Klain was the White House Ebola Response Coordinator in 2014-15.
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